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D. Administrative

- 1
- 2 15. National psychological warfare and special operations personnel  
control and allocation
- 3 16. Measures to refine operational psychological warfare techniques

E. Informational (12 Encl (15-ans))

17. Psychological exploitation of U. S. troop arrivals in Western  
Europe
18. Interdepartmental coordination and execution of current  
Russian plan

State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file

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**SUGGESTED INITIAL PROJECTS FOR PSB**

**I. Psychological Strategy in the cold war** { Strength - weakness  
Humiliation - triumph

Many individuals working in the field of psychological operations in the cold war have felt the absence of a "grand-strategy" -- a set of objectives toward the attainment of which all efforts can be directed. One cannot be so sanguine as to hope that such a strategy can be clearly outlined by any one agency or in a short period of time. Furthermore, it is a matter which clearly goes far beyond the competence of psychological operations specialists. These difficulties, however, do not excuse psychological operations planners from making what contribution they can toward the grand strategy, and the establishment of a Psychological Strategy Board gives them a better opportunity of doing so than they have had heretofore. It is believed, therefore, that one of the first tasks of the new board should be to set in motion a major effort to formulate a broad, worldwide psychological strategy for the cold war.

A suggested procedure for accomplishing this is as follows:

1. Appointment of a working group composed of the nation's very best brains in the field of psychological operations and making provision to see that they have facilities for concentrated work.

Some such membership as the following is suggested. Since it is not possible to be sure that the individuals named will be able to serve, this list represents more the type of composition recommended, rather than the actual composition.

Mr. Alfred Loomis, Chairman  
Dr. Philip Mosley  
Admiral Stevens  
General Magruder  
General McClure  
Mr. Edward Barrett  
Mr. Joseph Phillips

Dr. Hans Speier  
Mr. C. D. Jackson  
Mr. George Kennan  
Mr. Wallace Carroll  
Dr. Bernard Brodie  
Mr. Wimer  
General Donovan

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2. A working place outside Washington should be designated for meetings. It has been noted in previous similar cases that it is much simpler to enable top quality men to work on problems of this sort personally (rather than delegating them to subordinates) if they can be insulated from the pressure of routine duties. This insulation procedure is commonly adopted by such agencies as Brookings and RAND with a considerable measure of success.
3. The group should be asked to work on such very broad problems as the following:
  - a. What psychological and other measures can be taken to restrain Soviet aggression?
  - b. What psychological and other measures can be taken to strengthen our allies and potential allies?
  - c. How may the best statement of U. S. ideology be arrived at?
  - d. How can our cold war aims be defined?
4. The temporary staff of the PSB should be asked to take the following measures in preparation for this working group:
  - a. Make necessary arrangements for meeting place, secretarial help, security, etc.
  - b. Prepare briefing papers. (For example, an analysis of NSC papers and Presidential statements having a bearing on psychological operations.)
  - c. Arrange for oral briefings by governmental experts, as needed.

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5. The full group should be asked to meet for a three or four day period at the beginning of the summer and for a three or four day period toward the end of the summer. In between the two full meetings sub-groups should be asked to work on specific phases of the overall problem.
6. It should be emphasized that this is not to be viewed as an effort to work out a national policy binding on all agencies. It is rather an attempt to answer two questions:
  - a. From the point of view of psychological operations, what should our national policy be?
  - b. How may existing national policy be exploited more effectively through psychological operations?

## II. A Long-term Campaign to Improve the Personnel Situation in Psychological Operations

This campaign might be divided into two parts: (1) an effort to improve and coordinate training programs, and (2) an effort to induce superior personnel who already have the available qualifications to enter government service in the field of psychological operations. A considerable amount of basic work on the first part has already been accomplished, but coordination is still lacking. An approach to the second part might be as follows:

- (1) Ascertain through interviews with leading experts outside the government what their principal objections to entering government service are.
- (2) Work out with all agencies affected a long-term publicity program designed to attract first-rate personnel.
- (3) Approach key members of Congress with a view to obtaining their support in this campaign.

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### **III. Policy Planning and Research Survey**

This survey, which would be undertaken primarily by the temporary PSB with outside advice solicited as needed, should attempt to answer the following questions:

1. What policy planning for the cold war and hot war in the field of psychological operations is currently going on?
2. What basic research for psychological operations in the cold war and hot war is currently going on?
3. What additional planning and research is needed, and what agencies should undertake it?

### **IV. Survey of Evaluation Activities**

This survey should be undertaken along the same lines as the above.

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